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Illinois Compensation Act,4 as well as the broad terms of the
policy coverage, 49 required that result. From the standpoint of
the carrier, such a decision does nothing to discourage the employer from engaging in indiscriminate hiring of minor employees.
It should be said, however, on behalf of the minor employee that
a firm public policy requires that he be protected against such
hazards as can be anticipated. Among such hazards is the possibility that the employer may become insolvent and be unable to
respond for the additional compensation. To hold otherwise would
leave the minor without recourse against the carrier. It might be
noted that the problem seems to have been handled more effectively in Wisconsin under an appropriate statute. °
II.

CONTRACTS

Only one case can be said to contain anything significant so
far as general contract doctrines are concerned and even that is
of limited appeal. In Manthei v. Heimerdinger' an argument
arose as to whether a release given as to a common-law right of
action for personal injuries growing out of an automobile accident
should also operate to discharge a tavern proprietor from liability
even though he had, in violation of the Liquor Control Act, 2 sold
liquor to the already intoxicated tort-feasor. It is, without doubt,
clear that a release of one joint tort-feasor will operate to discharge
all others jointly responsible for the tort despite any contrary
intention on the part of the contracting parties. If, however, the
injury sustained may be said to be the result of two or more
independent but concurring causes, then an area of doubt may
exist as to whether the release of one serves to release all, especially so if the causes of action rest on different foundations and
48 111. 1Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 163(a) (3).
49 See paragraph I (a) of the standard form of workmen's compensation policy in
use in Illinois.
50 Wis. Stat. 1943, Ch. 102, § 102.62.
1332 Il. App. 335, 75 N. E. (2d) 132 (1947), noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvmw 358 and 43 IlI. L. Rev. 409.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 43, § 94 et seq.
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could be considered as separable. It was argued, in the case
mentioned, that the wrong of the operator of the motor vehicle
was distinct and independent from that of the tavern keeper, one
wrong arising out of common-law duties and the other resting
solely on statute, so that the release of the former should not
serve to discharge the latter, but the court held otherwise. It
indicated that, as the injury was a single and indivisible one and
the statutory remedy was designed merely to insure compensation
to the injured person, once compensation had been received, all
claim under the statute was gone. There is authority to support
the opposite result in other jurisdictions," and possibly so in this
state, 4 but the cogency of plaintiff's argument failed to convince
the court. Other, and more specialized, contract problems are
dealt with under appropriate groupings.
INSURANCE

Interpretation given to clauses commonly found in insurance
contracts always merits attention as the outcome of a single case
may have far-reaching effects. The case of McDaniel v. Glens
Falls Indemnity Company,5 a case of first impression in this state,
required consideration of an exemption clause in an automobile
liability policy to the effect that the coverage was not to apply
"while the automobile is used as a public or livery conveyance,
unless such use is specifically declared and described in this policy
and premium charged therefor." The plaintiff, an Illinois resident, insured under such a policy which also provided for medical
payments to herself and guests, planned to leave Los Angeles
with her mother intending to drive on to Dallas, Texas. Desiring
to have other passengers with her, she visited a travel agency
which made a business of seeking transportation for clients in
private cars between those points. She selected three from among
several applicants and they paid her a total of $30. While travel3 See, for example, Philips v. Aretz, 215 Minn. 325, 10 N. W. (2d) 226 (1943).

4 The cases in point are noted in 26 CHCAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 358 at 360-1.
5 333 Ill. App. 596, 78 N. E. (2d) 111 (1948).
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ing through New Mexico, an accident occurred in which the
insured and her mother were injured, both requiring medical
attention and hospitalization. The insurer refused to pay plaintiff's claim based on the medical coverage clause and, in the suit
which followed, disclaimed liability on the ground that the automobile was being used as a public or livery conveyance hence
exempted them under the policy terms. Plaintiff recovered judgment in the trial court for her medical expenses but was denied
allowance of attorney's fees. The insurer appealed and plaintiff
filed cross-errors.6 The Appellate Court for the Second District,
affirming the lower court ruling, held that the term "public conveyance," as used in the exemption clause, implied a holding out
of the vehicle to the use of the general public for hire, which was
not true of the case before it. Such decision follows a pattern
already set by the majority of jurisdictions which have had occasion to pass on the point. 7 Denial of recovery of attorney's fees
was sustained on the ground that, the point never having before
been presented in Illinois, the defendant had a right to have the
court adjudicate the issue involved.
Another policy clause which came before a reviewing court
for the first time in this state was involved in Coulter v. American
Employers' Insurance Company." Plaintiff therein had been issued
a standard automobile combination policy which included liability
coverage for bodily injury caused by the use of his trucks while
he was engaged in the scavenger business and particularly covered
the "loading and unloading thereof." While so engaged, plaintiff
parked his truck at the curb, entered a restaurant to make a
garbage collection, picked up one container and started up the
inside steps leading to a trap door opening onto the sidewalk.
6 The cross-error assigned failure to observe the provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947,
Ch. 73, § 767, regarding the allowance of attorney's fees.
7 See Marks v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 52 App. D. C. 225, 285 F. 959 (1923);
Park v. National Casualty Co., 222 Iowa 861, 270 N. W. 23 (1936) ; Elliott v. Behner,
150 Kan. 876, 96 P. (2d) 852 (1940); Wood v. Merchants Ins. Co. of Providence,
291 Mich. 573, 289 N. W. 259 (1939); Pimper v. National American Fire Ins. Co.,
139 Neb. 109, 296 N. W. 465 (1941).
8333 Ill. App. 631, 78 N. E. (2d) 131 (1948).
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As plaintiff pushed the trap door upward a pedestrian, passing
close by, was tripped and injured. The insurer, although notified
of the accident and of the fact that suit was threatened, ignored
the several notices and refused to defend, claiming the accident
did not fall within the loading and unloading provision of the
policy. Plaintiff settled the pedestrian's suit and then brought
the present action to recover the amount so paid together with
attorney's fees. Plaintiff's judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Second District which ruled that the accident
fell within the policy coverage.
Defendant had relied on the case of Ferry v. Protective Indemnity Company of New York, 9 a decision squarely in point,
where the court had said that, to bring the accident within the
"loading and unloading" clause, there had to be a connection
between the accident and the use of the vehicle insured. To that
end, the vehicle would have to be "directly connected with the
work of loading or it must have been an active factor in the operation."' 0 This view was rejected as being unsound and unsupported by the weight of authority, the Illinois court preferring
to be guided by the rule announced in State ex rel. Butte Brewing
Company v. District Court of Second Judicial District" and followed in subsequent cases. 12 Three points were said to be important in defining the area of coverage. These were first, the
intention of the parties to the contract; second, that "loading"
and "unloading" embrace more than the mere placing of goods
on or off the truck and may be said to include removal from resting point to truck or vice versa; and third, accidents occurring
along the line having some causal relationship with the insured
13
vehicle as such are within the boundaries of the clause.
The problem concerning just what acts are necessary to ac9 155 Pa. Super. 266, 38 A. (2d) 493 (1944).
10 155 Pa. Super. 266 at 269, 38 A. (2d) 493 at 494.
11110 Mont. 250, 100 P. (2d) 932 (1940).
12 Babien v. National Casualty Co., 143 Ohio St. 215, 54 N. E. (2d) 798 (1944);
Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. of New York, 108 Utah 500,
161 P. (2d) 423, 160 A. L. R. 1251 (1945).
13 108 Utah 500 at 509, 161 P. (2d) 423 at 427, 160 A. L. R. 1251 at 1257.
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complish a change of beneficiary under a life insurance policy
reappeared in Young v. American Standard Life Insurance Company. 14 There the insured was covered by two group policies
under certificates numbered 3603 and 7492 respectively. Plaintiff,
the insured's daughter, had been named beneficiary under both
certificates but, immediately before the insured's death, an attempt
had been made to change the beneficiary to one Alice Ellen Smith.
The master policy, under which the certificates were issued, permitted change of beneficiary on the filing of a written request
signed by the insured member and forwarded through his union,
such change becoming effective only when received at the home
office of the insurer.
The insured had died in the early hours of the morning of
October 22, 1943. On that day, at about 8:45 a. m., the insurer
received at its home office an undated request postmarked in Chicago on October 21st, apparently originating with and being signed
by the insured, designed to change the name of the beneficiary on
the second certificate. The request bore the legend, supposedly written by the insured, that it was "understood that such change shall
not become effective until endorsement has been made."'1 5 The
form was incomplete, however, in that blanks for the date and a
statement as to the relationship of the proposed beneficiary to the
insured were not filled in. The company promptly sent the request
form to an officer of the union, holders of the master policy, asking
that the insured be requested to supply the missing information.
In short order, the attorney for the proposed beneficiary returned
,the request, the form having been completed to show the name of
the proposed beneficiary with the added words "or my estate,"
the relationship was indicated by the word "fiance," and the
date was given as "10/8/1943."
No notice of the death of the
insured had reached the company, but it still refused to alter
the beneficiary provision because the wording to "Alice Ellen.
Smith or my estate" was regarded as indefinite or alternative.
14398 Ill. 565, 76 N. E. (2d) 501 (1948), noted in 34 Va. L. Rev. 471, in part
affirming 331 Ill. App. 5, 71 N. E. (2d) 828 (1947).
15398 111. 565 at 568, 76 N. E. (2d) 501 at 503.
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It so notified the attorney, sending along a new form for proper
completion. No other request reached the insurer. When plaintiff sued on the certificates, the insurer filed a cross-complaint in
interpleader and the case was transferred to the equity side of
the court which held in plaintiff's favor. The Appellate Court
reversed as to the first certificate but affirmed the holding on the
second. On further appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reinstated
the trial court decree favoring plaintiff as to both certificates.
Since the endorsement on the policy changing the beneficiary
could not have been made during the insured's lifetime, for he
was dead when the original request first reached the company,
the rule generally applicable would be that the rights of the named
beneficiary were fixed in accordance with the facts as they existed
at the time of the policyholder's death, which rights could not be
altered by any action of the company taken thereafter. 6 The
proposed beneficiary contended, however, that as the insured had
done all he could to effect a change of beneficiary, but had died
before formal completion of that change, a court of equity should
view the change as accomplished. 1 7 While the court was willing to
accept that view as valid,' it was of the opinion that the insured
had fallen far short of doing all he could as the original request
bore no date, the relationship of the proposed beneficiary had not
been given, both matters being treated as important, and he had
not, though required by the master policy, transmitted the request
for change through the union. Some point was also made of the
fact that the insured had embodied a condition into the request to
the effect that the change was not to be effective until endorsement
had been made. These omissions were regarded as sufficient to
convince the court that the attempted change was ineffective.
16 McEldowney v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 347 Ill. 66, 179 N. E. 520 (1932);
Freund v. Freund, 218 Ill. 189, 75 N. E. 925 (1905).
17 In other words, the requirement of endorsement of change of beneficiary on the
policy is merely a provision for the benefit of the insurer and subject to waiver,
either express or implied.
1 See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Douglass, 156 F. (2d) 367 (1946);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Moore, 145 F. (2d) 580 (1944); Sun Life Assur. Co. v.
Williams, 284 Ill. App. 222, 1 N. E. (2d) 247 (1936).
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Mention should be made of the case of Tomerlin v. Lancashire
Indemnity Company"9 wherein the court ruled that, under the
Illinois Insurance Code, 20 a non-resident plaintiff might serve a
foreign insurer licensed to do business in Illinois by delivering
summons to the Director of Insurance even though the cause of
action arose wholly without the state. After removal of the case
to the federal court, the defendant moved to quash process and
return and sought dismissal on an alleged lack of jurisdiction over
the person of defendant. The company relied on Morris & Company v. Skandinavia Insurance Company,21 a case in point but
one involving a Mississippi statute of similar wording, wherein
the United States Supreme Court had held the service of summons
to be ineffective. The court in the instant case point out, however, that the defendant in the cited case was not then, nor had it
prior thereto been, doing business within Mississippi but had
merely entered into a re-insurance contract in New York with
insurers of property in Mississippi and had appointed a statutory
agent in the last-named jurisdiction only because the same was
necessary to engage in the re-insurance business. It consequently
justified denial of the motion on the ground that the Illinois legislature, when adopting the statute in question, had in mind the
then present state of the Illinois law on the subject as declared
by our courts. In this connection it particularly relied on the
decision in Illinois Life Insurance Company v. Prentiss22 where
the rule had been laid down that, an action on a life insurance
policy being transitory, an Illinois company could properly be
sued in another state where it did business and had agents upon
whom service could be obtained even though the cause of action
had arisen under an Illinois contract of insurance with an Illinois
resident. From that premise, the court went on to say that had
1976 F. Supp. 168 (1948).
Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73 § 724.
21 279 U. S. 405, 49 S. Ct. 360, 73 L. Ed. 762 (1929). See also Morris & Co. v.
Skandinavia Ins. Co., 81 F. (2d) 346 (1936), where it was held that service of
summons on the insurer's statutory agent in Illinois was likewise ineffective but the
court indicated that had the insurer actually been doing business in Illinois the
service of summons would have been good.
22 277 Ill. 383, 115 N. E. 554 (1917).
20 Il.
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the legislature intended that foreign insurers licensed and doing
business in Illinois were not to be subject to suit in Illinois by
non-residents on actions arising elsewhere, it would have used more
limited language instead of the broad and unqualified terms in
23
which the present statute is couched.
SAIS

The dearth of significant cases in the law of sales, conspicuous
in recent years, still seems to continue. The only noteworthy case,
and that because of the novel factual situation, was the decision
in Standard Oil Company of Indiana v. Daniel Burkhartsmeier
Cooperage Company.24 Plaintiff there, a dealer in petroleum products, requested defendant, engaged in the business of cleaning and
reconditioning used steel barrels, to supply a quantity of such
reconditioned barrels. The written order carried the legend: "To
be thoroughly cleaned and painted. These barrels are to be entirely satisfactory in every respect or they will be returned for
full credit at no expense to us. For resale." Defendant accepted
the order and delivered a number of these steel barrels to plaintiff, who, in turn, sold and delivered one of them to a customer
for the storage of fuel oil. After the barrel had been placed in
the customer's cellar, the customer's twelve-year old son lit a
match and caused an explosion with severe injury to himself. The
explosion was attributable to the fact that the barrel had originally been filled with a highly inflammable and explosive lacquer,
the residue of which, although easily detectable, remained in the
barrel because defendant had failed to clean it away. Removal
could have been readily accomplished by following defendant's
ordinary cleaning processes. After plaintiff had paid for the
damage suffered by its customer, it sued the defendant for an
23 Cases involving service on foreign corporations other than insurers, decided
prior to the adoption of the present Insurance Code. may be found in National Can
Co. v. Weirton Steel Co., 314 Ill. 280, 145 N. E. 389 (1924), and in Simpson Fruit
Co. v. Railway Co., 245 Ill. 596, 92 N. E. 524 (1910). Any argument that the venue
of the suit was improper was nullified by the decision in Furst v. Brady, 375 Il.
425, 31 N. E.

(2d)

606, 133 A. L. R. 558 (1940), noted in

19 CHICAGo-KE-NT LAW

REvIEW 293, which had indicated that the venue provisions of the Civil Practice Act
had no application to non-resident plaintiffs suing insurance companies in this state.
24333 Ill. App. 338, 77 N. E. (2d) 526 (1948).
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alleged breach of express warranty to the effect that the barrels
were thoroughly cleaned. Judgment for the plaintiff in the trial
court was affirmed.
The defendant had denied the existence of an express warranty, had argued that the wording of the purchase order was of
such a nature as to preclude plaintiff from a recovery of damages,
had insisted that plaintiff should have inspected the barrels upon
delivery, and that anyway the proximate cause of the injury was
not the failure to clean the barrels but rather was the independent
act of the customer's son in lighting the match. In contrast, the
court found that the defendant's delivery of barrels under plaintiff's written order constituted an acceptance of that order with
all its terms and conditions; that defendant thereby represented
that all barrels would be thoroughly cleaned before delivery, without which representation plaintiff would not have entered into the
contract; that such representation constituted an express warranty
and, there being an express warranty, plaintiff was not required
25
to inspect the barrels.
The court likewise held that the right to return so much of
the merchandise for credit as was not entirely satisfactory did
not serve to limit the measure of plaintiff's recovery. The right
of the parties to contract as to the remedy in case of breach of
their agreement, recognized at common law as well as under Sections 49 and 71 of the Uniform Sales Act, 26 was held not to limit
the recovery but merely to provide a cumulative remedy which
plaintiff could exercise at its election if it wished, in preference
to suing for breach of warranty.
On the subject of causation, the court declared that the intervention of independent concurring or intervening forces will not
serve to break causal connection if the intervention of such forces
was itself probable or foreseeable. The evidence indicated that
defendant had purchased the barrels originally from a supplier
with intent to recondition and resell the same and had been warned
25 Underwood v. Wolf, 131 I1. 425, 23 N. E. 598 (1890) ; Cook v. Perfection Piano
Bench Mfg. Co., 236 Ill. App. 472 (1925).
26 Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, §§ 49 and 71.
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by that supplier that many of the barrels had been used to ship
inflammable materials with the result that dangerous fumes would
be apt to remain in the drums after they had been emptied. The
likelihood of an explosion from contact between these fumes and
an open flame, with resultant injury to persons or property, was
reasonably probable and foreseeable unless the barrels were adequately cleaned or due warning given. Omission in either respect
was sufficient to charge defendant with responsibility.
QUASI-CONTRACT

The victim of a tort may, at times, have an election to pursue
some form of delictual remedy or, choosing to waive the tort, may
sue instead as on an implied in law contract. Should he see fit to
select the latter, his recovery is, of course, limited to the worth of
the benefit conferred. If, for example, he has been induced through
fraud to part with money, he may sue as in trespass on the case
to collect whatever damage he may have suffered or he may, upon
offer to restore the status quo, recoup the amount paid out in an
action sounding in general assumpsit. In case he has been induced
to part with real property rather than money, his proceeding
speaks in equity rather than at law unless the wrongdoer has
resold the property and the victim would prefer to hold him for
the financial gain arising from the resale. These principles were
given application in the only significant case on restitution, that
of In re Thomas' Estate,27 when the court held it was proper to
dismiss a claim, filed in county court proceedings for the probate
of an estate, predicated on the decedent's fraud in obtaining a
conveyance of real property for an inadequate consideration because of his misrepresentations as to the character and worth of
the land. Since the claimant had failed to allege a resale of the
property at a profit, thereby postulating a claim on an implied in
law contract, it was held that the gravamen of the transaction
was in tort, hence beyond the jurisdiction of a court having limited
28
authority in probate matters.
27333 I1. App. 238, 77 N. E. (2d) 426 (1948).
28 IMl. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 354.
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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES.

Attention paid to jurisdictional requirements at the outset of
litigation may save hours of effort which might otherwise be spent
fruitlessly in the conduct of suits incapable of achieving anything
of value if those requirements be neglected. There is no evidence,
in the recent decisions, that any debatable questions have arisen
concerning the power of the Illinois courts to exercise their jurisdiction as that term relates to their ability to hear and determine
particular categories of proceedings. Some cases involving aspects
of jurisdiction in terms of control over the parties are noteworthy,
however.
The provision of the Civil Practice Act which permits the use
of substituted service of summons in actions in personam' has, in
the main, produced little dispute, and that only of the factual
variety, for the legislative language is clear and accords with all
requirements of due process. The case of Mahler v. Segel 2 is
entitled to notice because it grew out of the fairly standard and
common practice for persons, former residents of the state, to
leave a mailing address or a telephone listing with some relative
through whom communication with the non-resident might be
established. If, in fact, permanent residence has been established
elsewhere, the retention of these symbols of residence within the
state will not, according to the holding therein, be enough to
support substituted service upon the relative as a "person of the
family," nor can the premises so listed be regarded as a "usual
place of abode." In that respect, the abstract decision in Conley
v. McNamara3 may prove interesting for the headnote thereto
would indicate that service on a step-daughter who maintained
her separate apartment on the second floor of a building owned by
defendant, whose separate living quarters were on the first floor,
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 137.
2 333 Il. App. 138, 76 N. E. (2d) 795 (1948).
3 334 Il1. App. 396, 79 N. E. (2d) 645 (1948).

